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THE FUTURE OF THE STUDENT ANTI-
SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT: PROVIDING ACCESS 
TO U.S. COURTS FOR GARMENT WORKERS 
WORLDWIDE 
ALLIE ROBBINS∗ 
On December 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice issued a 
positive business review letter stating that universities may individually 
decide to license their apparel only to brands whose supplier factories pay 
workers a living wage, respect the right to organize unions, and provide 
safe and healthy working conditions.1 
 This letter marks a huge moment for the student anti-sweatshop 
movement, and has served as a catalyst for renewed discussion on the 
future of the movement. In this article, I explore the idea that jobber 
agreements—agreements between brands and unions governing working 
conditions in supplier factories—may be the best way forward for the next 
phase of international solidarity campaigns by the student anti-sweatshop 
movement.2 
In Part I, I provide a short history of the student anti-sweatshop 
movement within the United States.3 In Part II, I examine the possibility 
that a series of jobber agreements could be signed between brands and a 
consortium of unions around the world, which coupled with university 
policies, would require that collegiate apparel be produced in factories that 
respect workers’ rights.4 In Part III, I address the question of why access to 
U.S. Courts is so important.5 Part IV looks at the notion that jobber 
agreements would provide garment workers with access to United States 
                                                            
∗Allie Robbins is presently Director of Student Affairs and Co-Coordinator of Bar 
Exam Support Programs at CUNY Law School.  She would like to thank her 
colleagues at CUNY Law School as well as the CUNY Law alumni writing group for 
their support and feedback.  She would also like to thank the staff and students of 
United Students Against Sweatshops for all of their work throughout the years.  
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge 
Worker Rights Consortium’s Designated Suppliers Program For Collegiate Apparel, 
Antitrust 11-1656 (Dec, 16, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-
at-1656.html. 
2 This idea is not an original one. It has been discussed by USAS and USAS’ allies as 
a next step. I believe the origin of the idea can be credited to international solidarity 
guru Jeffrey Hermanson.  
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part II. 
5 See infra, Part III. 
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courts as third-party beneficiaries.6 In Part V, I caution that forum selection 
clauses are crucial as recent forum non conveniens jurisprudence has not 
looked favorably upon foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. corporations.7 Part VI 
briefly discusses the practical implementation of jobber agreements in the 
global collegiate apparel industry.8 
PART I 
HOW WE GOT HERE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STUDENT ANTI-
SWEATSHOP MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
As in many social movements throughout U.S. history, college students 
have played a critical role in the anti-sweatshop movement in the United 
States. It is precisely because this has been a movement—and not merely a 
stagnant organization—that it has been so successful. The history of the 
movement has been one of continuous adaptation as multinational 
corporations seek to evade negative publicity and abdicate responsibility 
for the conditions under which their goods are produced. 
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) was formed in 1997 by a 
group of undergraduate students who wanted to ensure that the apparel that 
bore their schools’ logos was made under conditions that respected the 
rights of the people who made the apparel.9 USAS members recognized 
early on that workers’ rights are human rights and that the conditions in 
garment factories were unacceptable.10 The first nationwide campaign 
centered around pressuring colleges and universities to sign codes of 
conduct that outlined the conditions under which their collegiate apparel 
was to be manufactured.11 The USAS model acknowledged the unique 
power that students possess within the college and university setting, and 
developed from the recognition that educational institutions have a 
responsibility to ensure that the apparel they license is made under safe and 
adequate conditions. A brand12 is legally permitted to produce apparel 
bearing that school’s logo only when it purchases a license from a college 
                                                            
6 See infra Part IV. 
7 See infra Part V. 
8 See infra Part VI. 
9 Telephone interview with Benjamin McKean, former Nat’l Organizer for United 
Students Against Sweatshops (Aug. 31, 2011). 
10See infra Part V. 
11 Telephone interview with Benjamin McKean, supra note 9. 
12 Throughout this article, the terms brand, licensee, and manufacturer may be used 
interchangeably. I prefer the term brand because it highlights the fact that most of these 
companies are merely names – the design and production are contracted out to 
subcontractors around the globe. In addition, a large reason behind the success of anti-
sweatshop organizing can be traced to the importance these companies place on their 
brand image. 
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or university.13 Thus, schools hold tremendous power in the global garment 
industry. USAS’s code of conduct campaign marked the first time that 
anyone attempted to hold colleges and universities accountable for how 
they handled this power.14 
This endeavor was far from inconsequential, as the collegiate apparel 
industry has been valued at $4 billion in the United States alone.15 Despite 
staunch resistance from university administrators and the brands to whom 
they license their logos,16 USAS held protests and sit-ins on campuses 
across the country.17 Students at seven universities held sit-ins during the 
spring semester of 1999, with students at the University of Arizona sitting 
in for a total of 225 hours.18 The next spring, fifteen more schools followed 
suit.19 The students won. Today, hundreds of colleges and universities have 
codes of conduct that serve as guidelines for the conditions under which 
their collegiate apparel must be made, and university administrators have a 
responsibility to the people who produce goods bearing their school’s 
                                                            
13 Glenn S. Bacal, Collegiate Trademark Licensing: The Basic Rules of the Game,” 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPT. (Jan. 11, 2007), http://www.asu.edu/counsel/brief/ 
trademark.html.  
14See United Student Against Sweatshops, UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw. 
org/our_union/allies_and_partners?id=0006 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) (explaining 
that because students knew “that their universities had the power to demand that 
apparel bearing their logo be made in a factory where workers rights are protected,” the 
students demanded the schools adopt a code of conduct for licenses and developed a 
code of conduct monitoring system to enforce the adopted codes of conduct.). 
15 Peter Drier, Is the Perfect Factory Possible?, THE NATION (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/164072/perfect-factory-possible. The high value of 
the collegiate apparel industry is somewhat unique to the United States, as our nation’s 
obsession with collegiate athletics renders collegiate apparel quite valuable. See 
Christopher Candland, What Do Corporate Codes of Conduct Do? The Effectiveness of 
Codes in Improving Internationally-Recognized Core Labor Standards in Thai 
Production of U.S. Collegiate Apparel and Footwear (Sept. 3, 2004), http://www. 
wellesley.edu/Polisci/Candland/codes.pdf (explaining that “the collegiate apparel 
industry was valued at $2.5 billion” in 1999, accounting for one percent of the U.S. 
apparel industry). 
16 Opposition initially had three phases. First the brands denied there were any labor 
issues at their supplier factories at all. Then the brands denied they were responsible for 
the problems. Then the brands began to adopt corporate social responsibility language 
and alter the way they interacted with university administrators. Interview with 
Benjamin McKean, supra at 9. 
17 Duke University students held the first sit-in, which lasted thirty-one hours. Denise 
K. Magner, Duke Students Stage Sit-In to Insure That Campus Apparel Doesn’t Come 
From Sweatshops, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Feb.1, 1999), http://chronicle.com/ 
article/Duke-Students-Stage-Sit-In-to/112614/. 
18 Aaron Kreider, Sit In! A Tactical Analysis, CAMPUS ACTIVISM (Jan. 19, 2005), 
http:// www.campusactivism.org/uploads/sit-in-tactical-analysis.pdf. 
19 Id.  
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logo.20 
One of the key components of this code of conduct campaign was 
quarterly disclosure of the names and locations of the factories producing 
collegiate apparel.21 The structure of the global garment industry was (and 
remains today) such that a major collegiate apparel brand, such as Nike or 
Russell, produces its collegiate apparel at hundreds, sometimes thousands, 
of factories worldwide and moves production to different factories every 
few months.22 The brands generally do not own these factories, but 
subcontract production to supplier factories owned by middlemen. To have 
an impact in this industry, therefore, USAS activists had to identify which 
factories were producing collegiate apparel and understand the nature of 
those factories’ production cycles.23 Thus, along with codes of conduct, 
USAS demanded that the brands producing collegiate apparel disclose to 
their university licensors the names and addresses of all factories producing 
collegiate apparel for that brand every quarter.24 This requirement quickly 
became even more contentious than the regulatory provisions of the codes 
of conduct. Brands launched a major opposition claiming that this 
information was a trade secret and that its release would destroy the global 
garment industry and lead to industrial espionage.25 Despite this opposition, 
students were successful. Major collegiate apparel brands now provide the 
names and locations of the factories producing collegiate apparel to their 
university licensors.26 The universities, in turn, provide this information to 
                                                            
20 Sarah Chavez, Workers Rights Consortium and University Logos ( 2007), 
available at http://irps.ucsd.edu/assets/020/8408.pdf. 
21 David J. Doorey, Can Factory Disclosure Improve Labor Practices in the Apparel 
Industry? A Case Study of Nike and Levi-Strauss, 4 COMP. RESEARCH IN LAW & POL. 
ECON. 1, 13-15 (2008); see also UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, CAMPUS 
ORGANIZING MANUAL, 15, available at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/aasp/chateauvert/ 
411/usaskit.pdf.  
22 Allie Robbins, Could Sourcing From Union Shops Be Against the Law?, 5 ORIG. 
LAW REV. 46, 60-62 (2009). 
23 Id. at 55. 
24 Id. 
25 While it was not fully clear at the time what the brands meant by this, after 
receiving the data, students surmised that the brands did not want consumers to know 
that the same workers who manufactured their goods were producing goods for other 
brands in those same factories. This, the brands feared, would begin to erode the 
consumer confidence in the uniqueness of the brand’s product. Interview with 
Benjamin McKean, supra note 9. It is worth mentioning that if jobber agreements were 
adopted, it could once again lead to greater transparency in the garment industry as any 
brand that violates an agreement by refusing to pay a premium to provide for a living 
wage may be required, through the discovery process, to reveal even more information 
about its financial structure. 
26 This is often done through the licensing and marketing firm The Collegiate 
Licensing Company, which acts as an intermediary between brands and university 
licensing officials.  
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the public.27 This means that if workers at a garment factory are organizing, 
USAS members can know which universities’ apparel is being made in that 
factory and can adjust their organizing strategy accordingly. USAS’s 
disclosure victory paved the way for factory disclosure throughout the rest 
of the global garment industry as well. For example, since 2005, the 
International Textile, Garment & Leather Workers’ Federation has made 
great strides in obtaining factory location information from major garment 
producers worldwide.28 
Students did not stop their organizing efforts there; the next problem for 
student organizers was deciding what to do with this information. Even 
with knowledge of which factories were supposed to abide by the codes of 
conduct the universities adopted, and information about specific factories 
that were not complying, USAS alone lacked the resources and expertise to 
enforce the codes of conduct.29 In what was perhaps USAS’s boldest move, 
students decided to develop an organization that would focus specifically 
on monitoring the working conditions in factories that produced collegiate 
apparel.30 In 1999, students began to lay the groundwork for the formation 
of the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC).31 That same year, USAS 
members began demanding their schools affiliate with the WRC,32 even 
before the WRC held its founding conference.33 The WRC officially 
opened its doors in 2000.34 Today, university administrators, students, and 
labor rights experts govern the WRC.35 No brands are permitted to have 
                                                            
27 About the Factory Disclosure Database, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, (last 
visited May 30, 2012), http://workersrights.org/search/about_fdd.asp. 
28 Factory Lists, ITGLWF, http://www.itglwf.org/lang/en/factories-list.html (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2011). 
29 Robbins, supra note 22, at 55. 
30 At the same time, President Clinton’s Apparel Industry Partnership was becoming 
the Fair Labor Association (FLA), and began to court universities to join its governing 
body. Students quickly realized the FLA was simply an attempt by brands to control 
the movement against sweatshops “in a way that couldn’t hurt them.” Interview with 
Benjamin McKean, supra note 9.  
31See Ryan Gabrielson, SAS Publicly Announces Support of Workers Rights 
Consortium, WILDCAT ONLINE NEWS (Nov. 16, 1999), http://wc.arizona.edu/papers/ 
93/60/08_1_m.html (describing USAS’ endorsement of the WRC). 
32 Another round of sit-ins commenced and were met with staunch university 
opposition. At the University of Wisconsin–Madison, for example, fifty-four students 
were pepper sprayed, assaulted, and arrested during a sit-in. Ian Trupin, Trupin ’13: 
Celebrating 10 Years of the Worker Rights Consortium, THE BROWN DAILY HERALD 
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.browndailyherald.com/trupin-13-celebrating-10-years-of-
the-worker-rights-consortium-1.2638819. 
33 The organizing history behind the WRC is truly a testament to the power of 
student organizing. Students developed the idea for the WRC and forced their 
universities to affiliate, before the organization formally existed. 
34 History, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/about/history.asp 
(providing the history of WRC). 
35Governance, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/about/govern. 
asp. (last visited July 13, 2011). 
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any involvement in the governance of the organization.36 Affiliate 
universities pay an annual fee to the WRC and provide factory disclosure 
information.37 The WRC in turn works with international labor rights 
experts to monitor conditions in garment factories around the world. 
Presently, the WRC has 181 university affiliates and five high school 
affiliates,38 and employs staff in eight countries.39 
Through their collaboration, USAS and the WRC have helped garment 
factory workers worldwide attain better working conditions, organize 
unions, and obtain higher wages.40 This has been done primarily through 
solidarity with individual factory struggles.41 The WRC conducts 
investigations of factory compliance with codes of conduct and makes 
recommendations to its university affiliates regarding which type of action 
should be taken.42 USAS members support worker organizing through 
campus activism that results in universities pressuring brands to step in and 
remedy code of conduct violations.43 Those brands then require factories to 
recognize the workers’ union, pay higher wages, fix unsafe working 
conditions, or otherwise respond to the demands of the workers.44 
While this has been effective in many cases, USAS members have also 
seen factories shut down shortly after workers successfully organize for 
their rights, as brands pull their orders in search of unorganized workforces 
and lower costs.45 Adding to the volatile nature of the industry, on January 
                                                            
36 Frequently Asked Questions, WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights. 
org/faq.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2011) (explaining that “the WRC is governed by a 15-
member board, including five representatives of university administrations elected by 
the University Caucus, five representatives of United Students Against Sweatshops and 
five representatives of the WRC Advisory Council, an international body of human 
rights and labor rights experts.”). 
37 Id. 
38WRC Affiliated Colleges and Universities, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, 
http://workersrights.org/about/as.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). 
39 Contact Us, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/contact/ (last 
visited July 13, 2011). 
40 See, e.g., Robert J.S. Ross, A Tale of Two Factories: Successful Resistance to 
Sweatshops and the Limits of Firefighting, 30 LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL 65, 65-66 
(2006) (providing examples of successful worker campaigns that obtained union 
recognition and benefits).  
41 The WRC’s first factory investigation took place in Mexico, at the Kukdong 
Factory. Myra McGriff, Nike Strike Testes WRC’s Procedures, THE OBSERVER (Feb. 
16, 2001), available at, http://www.nd.edu/~observer/02162001/News/6.html. 
42Factory Investigations, WORKERS RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://workersrights.org/ 
Freports/index.asp#freports (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
43 Robbins, supra note 22, at 56-57. 
44 Doorey, supra note 21, at 15. 
45 See, e.g., Nike Supplier Closes Unionized Factory, Shifts Work to Vietnam, 
PEACEWORK MAGAZINE (Oct. 2007), http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/nike-
supplier-closes-unionized-factory-shifts-work-vietnam. 
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1, 2005 the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), a series of quotas governing 
how many garments each country could export, completely phased out.46 
The anti-sweatshop movement feared that the MFA phase out would 
worsen the environment for garment workers by consolidating garment 
production in a few countries based on lower workers’ rights standards, 
instead of permitting production in hundreds of countries worldwide.47 
Brands’ continuous efforts to avoid enforcement of the code of conduct 
and the phase out of the MFA created a desire for a more comprehensive 
anti-sweatshop program that would prohibit companies from shutting down 
factories to cut costs or to avoid dealing with an organized workforce.48 In 
2005, USAS partnered with unions in the U.S. and throughout the world, as 
well as other allies in the anti-sweatshop movement, to develop a structural 
response known as the Designated Suppliers Program (DSP).49 According 
to a proposal written at the launch of the DSP: 
The program calls for universities to source their apparel from 
designated supplier factories that “have been determined by 
universities to have affirmatively demonstrated full and consistent 
respect for the rights of their employees.” In addition to adhering 
to standards embodied in university codes of conduct, factories 
will also have to evidence a respect for rights of association and 
pay a living wage. The USAS DSP further stipulates that 
university licensees will pay these factories prices for their 
products sufficient to allow factories to achieve these standards. 
Prices will represent modest increases over industry norms, and 
licensees will be expected to maintain the kind of long-term 
relationships with these factories necessary to allow for a 
reasonable degree of financial stability and job security. These 
factories will produce primarily or exclusively for the university 
logo goods market.50 
 
In a nutshell, universities adopting the DSP would commit to having an 
increasing percentage of their licensed apparel manufactured in factories 
that respect basic worker rights. In order to accomplish this, brands would 
be required to pay a premium to ensure the provision of a living wage and 
                                                            
46 Telephone interview with Jessica Rutter, former National Organizer for United 
Students Against Sweatshops, August 31, 2011. 
47 Id. 
48 Robbins, supra note 22, at 62 (explaining that without comprehensive 
enforcement, companies would shut down factories that respect workers’ rights 
because it was cheaper to produce elsewhere or easier to avoid negotiation with an 
organized workforce). 
49 Id. at 2. 
50 Purmina Bose, From Agitation to Institutionalization: The Student Anti-Sweatshop 
Movement in the New Millennium, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 232-233 
(2008) (emphases added).  
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maintain long-term relationships with supplier factories to improve 
sustainable wages and working conditions.51 Despite years of successful 
organizing, the DSP has not been fully implemented, largely due to 
unfounded concerns about anti-trust laws.52 Similar to their response to 
USAS’ initial demands for codes of conduct and factory disclosure, brands 
also argued it would be impractical to implement the DSP and that it would 
upend the entire garment industry.53 Nike, Adidas, and Reebok went on a 
tour of college campuses, speaking to administrators, holding events, and 
meeting with licensing committees in an attempt to dissuade university 
officials from adopting the principles of the DSP.54 Presently, more than 
fifty schools have agreed to the framework of the DSP, including some big 
names in college athletics such as the entire University of California 
system, Duke University, and the University of Washington.55 
Unfortunately, the Program has largely remained stagnant for six years, as 
fear generated by brands has successfully stalled implementation.56 On 
December 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) 
released a business review letter finding the provisions of the DSP lawful 
and in compliance with anti-trust laws.57 This is a tremendous victory as 
private plaintiffs have never succeeded when challenging initiatives 
protected by a DOJ Business Review clearance.58 Student activists are 
currently working to determine how to proceed. What remains clear, 
however, is that work of the past six years cannot be undone and a new 
organizing model, one maintaining the basic tenets of the DSP, must 
emerge. 
Over the past few years, USAS has largely returned to individual factory 
solidarity campaigns, and has continued to have success with this model 
despite continued attempts by brands to abdicate their responsibility and 
                                                            
51 Robbins, supra note 22, at 58. 
52 Brands raised the concern that if multiple universities agree to the conditions of the 
Designated Suppliers Program and decided to source only from factories on a list of 
“good factories” that meet worker rights standards there would be unlawful collusion. 
This, in turn, created reluctance on the part of universities to go ahead with the 
Program. ROBBINS, supra note 22, at 63-70. 
53 Interview with Jessica Rutter, supra note 46. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Robbins, supra note 22, at 63. 
57 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Will Not Challenge 
Worker Rights Consortium’s Designated Suppliers Program For Collegiate Apparel, 
Antitrust 11-1656 (Dec., 16, 2011), available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/ 11-at-1656.html. 
58 Memorandum from Scott Nova on Business Review Process for the DSP to WRC 
Affiliate Universities and Colleges (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://workersrights. 
org/university/memo/121611.html. 
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out-organize student activists.59 Recently, for example, USAS used the 
power of its universities to not only force Russell Athletic to reopen a 
factory in Honduras that had been shut down after workers successfully 
unionized, but also to persuade the brand not to fight unionization at its 
seven other factories in Honduras.60 In addition, the WRC has continued its 
factory monitoring efforts and, in the summer of 2011, successfully 
pressured the June Textile Factory in Cambodia to pay severance to 
workers that made collegiate apparel. In the same summer, the WRC also 
successfully pressured Nike to compensate workers after PT Kizone, a 
collegiate apparel factory in Indonesia, closed its doors.61 Recently, USAS 
has launched a similar campaign against Adidas in response to the brand’s 
refusal to pay severance to 2800 Indonesian factory workers whose factory 
was shut down.62  While these victories are laudable and profoundly change 
lives, the larger question remains of how to effectively create change in the 
global garment industry in a manner that does not permit brands to undo 
those victories as soon as they feel the spotlight is off of a particular 
factory. The procurement of a positive business review letter from the DOJ 
renders the moment ripe for a restructuring of the student anti-sweatshop 
movement. 
PART II 
THE PROPOSAL: JOBBER AGREEMENTS 
 
 The answer to what the anti-sweatshop movement must do next may 
lie in the movement’s own national history. Jobber agreements (also known 
as Hazantown Agreements after the case that solidified a union’s right to 
target jobbers),63 were a key tactic used by the International Ladies 
Garment Workers’ Union to hold brands accountable for the working 
                                                            
59 Robbins, supra note 22, at 61. 
60 Steven Greenhouse, Labor Fights Ends in Win for Students, NEW YORK TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/18/ 
business/18labor.html (describing the shutdown of a Russell Athlectic factory in 
Honduras after the workers unionize and an agreement by Russell Athletics to reinstate 
the workers and permit unionization in its other Honduras factories). 
61 News & Updates, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www.workersrights.org/ 
freports/WRC%20Assessment%20re%20PT%20Kizone%20(Indonesia)%201-18-
12.pdf.(last visited May 30, 2012). 
62 badidas: all in sweatshops?, United Students Against Sweatshops, 
www.badidas.com, last visited March 22, 2013.  Thus far, Cornell University, Oberlin 
College, the University of Washington, Rutgers University, Georgetown University, 
the College of William and Mary, Santa Clara University, and Penn State have all cut 
their licensing contracts with Adidas in response to this campaign. 
63 See Danielson v. Joint Bd. of Coat, Suit & Allied Garment Workers’ Union, 494 F. 
2d 1230 (1974) (where “Hazantown Agreements” collective bargaining agreements 
specific to the garment industry, originated). 
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conditions in the factories to which they subcontract beginning in the early 
twentieth century.64 The term jobber refers to those companies that 
subcontract production of the garments they later sell to retailers (or 
universities).65 These are the brands whose names most consumers 
recognize, such as Nike, Adidas, and Champion. According to a recent 
jobber agreement between Liz Claiborne and the Union of Needletrades 
Industrial and Textile Employees (UNITE), a jobber is defined as “one who 
does not manufacture garments in its own shop but who has all of its 
garments produced (sewn, finished, pressed and sometimes cut) by 
contractors and who may or may not employ cutters and/or sample makers 
and/or distribution workers or others.”66 Similar to other jobber 
agreements, the Liz Claiborne agreement states:  
 
This Jobbers Agreement governs the overall relationship 
between the Company and the Union including the 
Company's use of contractors to produce its garments in the 
continental United States. The terms of this Agreement are 
applicable solely in the continental United States and shall 
have no force and effect to any entities or operations outside 
of the continental United States.67 
 
Such agreements have successfully allowed unions in the United States to 
organize garment factories, even when those factories are not owned by the 
brands themselves, and subsequently force companies to provide decent 
wages and benefits to garment workers in the United States. Since most 
garment production has been moved outside of the United States,68 the key 
to improving working conditions in the apparel industry may be to expand 
the scope of jobber agreements to include workers in subcontracted 
factories around the world.69 These agreements differ from collective 
                                                            
64 The Ladies’ Garment Worker, MONTHLY NEWSLETTER (Internat’l Ladies’ Garment 
Workers’ Union), Oct. 1916, at 22. 
65 See, e.g., Jobbers Agreement By & Between: Liz Claiborne, Inc., & Union of 
Needletraders, Industrial & Textile Employees (June 1, 2000), http://contracts.onecle. 
com/liz/unite.jobbers.2000.06.01.shtml. 
66.Id. at 4. 
67Id. at 5. 
68 Scott Nova, Outsourcing Tragedy: On the 100th Anniversary of Triangle 
Shirtwaist, Workers Are Still Dying in Garment Factory Fires, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-nova/outsourcing-tragedy-on-
th_b_84055 8.html. 
69 The manufacturing industry may see even more outsourcing of jobs if the Senate 
passes the “Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act,” which was passed by 
the House of Representatives on September 15, 2011 as H.R. 2587. This bill eliminates 
the power of the National Labor Relations Board to force a company to reopen a 
factory or production line that was closed in violation of the National Labor Relations 
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bargaining agreements (the traditional contract between unions and 
companies that delineate working conditions) because they cover 
conditions in supplier factories not directly owned by the brand. 
Under this proposal, brands would sign jobber agreements with unions 
both in the United States and around the world. Presumably, several unions 
from different countries would sign the same basic agreement with 
addendums delineating living wages based on local conditions and laws. 
For example, Nike could sign a contract with unions in the U.S., Honduras, 
and the Dominican Republic, requiring all of Nike’s supplier factories in 
each of the three countries to comport with the terms set forth in the jobber 
agreement. Following this model, entire regions of the world could become 
subject to contracts between brands and unions. These contracts would set 
baseline working conditions in the garment industry and outline the 
responsibilities of multinational corporations in ensuring that those 
standards are met. Following the model set forth by the DSP, students 
could demand that universities only license their logo to companies that 
sign such jobber agreements.70 In this way the collegiate apparel industry 
would become saturated with factories that respect the rights of their 
employees. The basic provisions of the jobber agreements would most 
likely mirror those set forth in the DSP, including respect for the right to 
organize and freedom of association, long-term brand/factory relationships, 
payment of a premium to provide a living wage, equality for women 
workers, and the maintenance of adequate health and safety conditions.  
As each university would individually adopt this requirement, as they did 
with the DSP, anti-trust concerns are moot.71 Instead of presenting legal 
impediments, as brands erroneously claimed the DSP did, this proposal 
actually provides garment workers with additional legal protections they do 
not currently enjoy. If such jobber agreements were in place, garment 
workers in factories subject to these agreements would then be able to avail 
themselves of the protections of the U.S. court system as third party 
                                                            
Act. As a consequence, it will make it easier for employers to move jobs out of the 
United States. See Press Release from Kimberly Freeman Brown, Exec. Dir., Kimberly 
Freeman Brown on H.R. 2587, American Rights at Work (Sept. 15, 2011), 
http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/press-center/2011-press-releases/statement-by-
kimberly-freeman-brown-on-hr-2587-20110915-1047-418-418.html. 
70 This is where the power dynamic that has led USAS to fifteen years of success 
comes in. Students would pressure universities to only license their logo to brands that 
sign jobber agreements (and only for production in those factories subject to the jobber 
agreement). In order to remain competitive, therefore, brands would have to sign jobber 
agreements. Workers and the WRC could then enforce those agreements. 
71 If each university individually adopts a policy requiring a certain percentage of its 
licensed apparel to be produced by brands that have signed jobber agreements, the anti-
trust concerns of universities colluding with one another will no longer be valid as each 
school will be making independent decisions about its own licensing. Each school 
already retains the right to license its logo to whomever it chooses. This is merely a 
component of that right. 
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beneficiaries. They would no longer have to rely solely on the limited 
resources and organizing prowess of university students in the United 
States, but would themselves have legal recourse to hold brands 
accountable. 
PART III 
WHY ACCESS TO U.S. COURTS IS CRITICAL 
 
Garment workers could benefit greatly from bringing their claims in U.S. 
courts because of the corruption and anti-union violence present in many 
countries around the world. The desire to allow potential breach of contract 
lawsuits to be brought in U.S. courts is not about forum shopping for the 
best law; indeed, enforcement of U.S. labor laws and the strength of the 
U.S. labor movement have been declining in recent decades,72 and many 
countries have much stronger labor laws than the U.S.73 Instead, the desire 
to allow garment workers to bring their claims in U.S. courts is about 
protecting the life and liberty of garment workers who are brave enough to 
stand up for their rights. According to the World Trade Organization, the 
top fifteen exporters of clothing are China, the European Union, Hong 
Kong, Turkey, India, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, United States, 
Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, Tunisia and Morocco.74 
The International Trade Union Confederation reported that labor 
activists in China frequently face harassment and repression75 Striking 
workers have been beaten and subject to violent and deadly reprisals, while 
labor leaders have been detained and incarcerated for their organizing 
efforts.76 China forbids the existence of independent trade unions 
altogether, and only permits workers to join the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions.77 In Hong Kong, “workers and unions continue to have little 
opportunity to defend their rights in practice, and collective bargaining 
                                                            
72 See, Alejandro Reuss, What’s Behind Union Decline in the United States?, 
DOLLARS & SENSE (Mar. 31, 2011). 
73 See, e.g., Laura Clawson, German Auto Manufactures High Profits and High Pay 
Show Why U.S. Labor Laws Need to Be Stronger, DAILY KOS (DEC. 28, 2011) http:// 
www.dailykos.com/story/2011/12/28/1049409/-German-auto-manufacturers-high-
profits-and-high-pay-show-why-US-labor-laws-need-to-be-stronger?via=blog_1 
(pointing out that “the German constitution itself includes a second mechanism for 
keeping employees involved in the decisions of the firm for which they work”). 
74 World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2010 at 14 (2010), http:// 
wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2010_e/its10_toc_e.htm. 
75 Int’l Trade Union Confederation [ITUC], Annual Survey of Violations of Trade 
Union Rights 132 (2011), http://survey.ituc-csi.org/. 
76Id., at 134-135.  
77 SOLIDARITY CTR, JUSTICE FOR ALL THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN CHINA 
(2004), available at, http://solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?contentid=928. 
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rights are regularly ignored.”78 In 2010, judicial harassment toward trade 
unions continued in Turkey, despite a Constitutional amendment.79 
Violence against those who stand up for their rights at work is far too 
common. In India in 2010, for example, police and companies violently 
arrested and harassed union leaders80 In addition, the garment industry in 
India has seen a wave of suicides. 81 In India, there is no legal obligation in 
the private sector for employers to recognize unions or collectively bargain 
with their employees, and labor protections are diminished even further 
inside Export Processing Zones, where many supplier factories are 
situated.82 The situation for garment workers in Bangladesh is no better. In 
April 2010, garment workers faced murders and arrests when they 
protested to demand a minimum wage.83 Stories like this are commonplace 
in nearly all of the world’s leading textile and apparel exporting countries. 
Workers in Vietnam, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Tunisia, and Morocco also face brutal violence and detention of trade union 
activists.84 Organizing for basic workers’ rights is thus a very risky 
undertaking. 
It is not simply the repression of workers’ rights that is a concern in 
many garment-producing nations. Judicial corruption further underscores 
why access to U.S. courts is crucial: 
A functioning judiciary is the guarantor of fairness and a powerful 
weapon against corruption. But people’s experiences in many 
countries fall far short of this ideal. In some countries the majority 
of those who had contact with courts encountered bribe demands, 
and the total amount paid in bribes can reach staggering 
proportions. Corruption in the judiciary goes beyond the bribing 
of judges. Court personnel are paid off to slow down or speed up a 
trial, or to make a complaint go away. Judges are also subject to 
                                                            
78 ITUC, supra note 755, at 138. 
79 Id. at 221-225 (workers were laid off or forced to resign and join “management 
friendly organisations,” due to union membership). 
80 Id. at 140 (“In the two years ending in September 2010, 910 garment workers, 
including members of their family, in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu, committed suicide. 
Garment factories in Tirupur produce about ninety percent of all India’s cotton 
knitwear exports.”). 
81 Id. at 141. 
82 Int’l Trade Union Confederation [ITUC], Internationally Recognized Core Labour 
Standards in India: Report for the WTO General Council Review of the Trade Policies 
of India, (Sep. 2011) available at www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/final_India_TPR_Report 
_3.pdf. 
83 ITUC, supra note 75 at 123 (explaining that garment workers were demanding “a 
[monthly] minimum wage of BDT 5,000 [US$66.62]” and noting that, during the 
protests, “six workers were killed and many injured,” while “[t]rade union leaders were 
arrested [and] tens of thousands of garment workers charged in connection with the 
protests”). 
84 Id. 
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pressure from above, with legislators or the executive using their 
power to influence the judiciary, starting with skewed 
appointment processes.85 
 
In Thailand, for example, a separate court system known as the Labor 
Courts presides over labor law issues in the private sector.86 The Labor 
Courts function as a tripartite body with a judge from the Ministry of 
Justice presiding alongside one associate judge elected by employer 
associations and one associate judge elected by labor associations.87 In 
2006, the U.S. Department of State found frequent abuse in the judicial 
system, and employers often did not pay workers their awards in full.88 An 
investigation by the Thai Senate found that “as many as half of the 200 
associate judges in the Central Labor Court might have paid bribes to 
influence their election as judges.”89 Many judges admitted to buying their 
posts, and the Senate committee found that judges who bribed their way 
into office enjoyed connections with powerful people in business, often 
siding with employers in labor disputes.90 Further, the Ministry of Labor 
has been criticized for its failure to verify the legitimacy of corporate 
registration documents.91 This environment can hardly be described as one 
that would provide garment workers with a fair process for adjudicating a 
claim based on the breach of a jobber agreement. 
Thailand is not unique in this regard. Many other leading garment-
producing countries have notoriously corrupt judicial systems as well. In 
Morocco, for example, the King appoints all government officials, 
including judges.92 The influence of the King and his Minister of Justice 
retain the power to step in and obstruct inquiries at any point, and they 
exert that power frequently on behalf of the influential in Moroccan 
                                                            
85 Transparency Int’l, Annual Report 2010, 39, available at http://www.transparency. 
org/publications/annual_report. 
86 SOLIDARITY CTR., JUSTICE FOR ALL THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN 
THAILAND 38 (2007), available at http://solidaritycenter.org/content.asp?pl=910&sl= 
910&contentid=911. 
87 Id. 
88 U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & Labor, Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices: Thailand, 2006, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ rls/hrrpt/2006/78792.htm. 
89 SOLIDARITY CTR., supra note 86, at 39. 
90 Id.  
91Id. (noting that there was no verification to ensure the authenticity and genuineness 
of the companies and employer associations as well as the signatures on incorporation 
and registration documents). 
92 Transparency Int’l, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial 
Systems 233, 
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/pub/global_corruption_report_2007_corru 
ption_and_judicial_systems (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
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society.93 Turkey’s judicial system relies largely on a series of self-selected, 
unregulated expert witnesses because of limited judicial expertise, 
resources, and time.94 Consequently, judges accept the reports of private 
experts whose reports are often patently false.95 Public perception, even 
among those involved in the legal system, is that Turkey’s judiciary is 
extremely corrupt, second only to the tax department as the most corrupt 
sector.96 In 1999, Professor Hayrettin Ökçesiz of Akdeniz University 
conducted a survey of 666 lawyers which revealed ninety-five percent 
claimed corruption existed in the judiciary. Following the survey, Professor 
Ökçesiz was subjected to investigation and has not continued to further 
research the issue.97 
In Bangladesh, a 2010 survey by Transparency International’s 
Bangladesh chapter found that eighty-eight percent of individuals who had 
interacted with the judiciary said they were exposed to corruption, and it 
was ranked as the country’s most corrupt institution.98 Bribing judicial 
officials is commonplace, with bribes averaging twenty-five percent of 
annual income of those who have used the court system.99 Extremely heavy 
caseloads coupled with the rarity of disciplinary proceedings contribute to 
this climate of bribery and corruption.100 
Bribery is commonplace in other garment-producing countries as well. 
In India, for example, personnel at all levels of the judiciary regularly 
accept bribes.101 One survey found that over half of the money paid in 
bribes went to lawyers, while the remaining portions were paid to court 
officials, judges, and middlemen.102 Similarly, in Pakistan, bribes are paid 
to judges, court employees, public prosecutors, opponent’s lawyers, and 
witnesses at a price of almost 2.5 times the amount paid in bribes in other 
public institutions.103 Chronic backlogs, leading to substantial delays in 
both criminal and civil cases, leave Pakistan’s judiciary ripe for this type of 
                                                            
93 Id. at 233-235. 
94 Id. at 280. 
95 Id. (judges commonly accept private experts’ reports, and rarely discount such 
patently false testimony, because they “don’t have the expertise to decide technical 
issues or the time to go to the scene of a crime and there is no pool of professionals to 
do it for them.”). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (Since Professor Hayrettin Ökçesiz of Akdeniz University was subjected to 
investigation because of this survey, no one has continued to pursue this research). 
98 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 85, at 40. 
99 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 92, at 179. 
100Id. 
101 Id. at 215. 
102 Id. (explaining that the estimated annual bribes in India are paid in the following 
proportions: “[sixty-one]percent to lawyers; [twenty-nine]percent to court officials; 
[five] percent to judges; and [five] percent to middlemen”). 
103 Id. at 244. 
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corruption.104 In Mexico, the situation is similarly troubling. In 2010, court 
decisions were noticeably susceptible to improper influence.105 Civil 
society organizations pointed to corruption, judicial inefficiency, and a lack 
of transparency in the judiciary as major contributing problems.106 The 
judiciaries of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Vietnam also suffer 
from a lack of independence and improper influence by executive branch 
officials, political parties, and private business interests.107 
This is merely a snapshot of anti-union violence and judicial corruption 
in many garment-producing nations. While US employers have propped up 
a multi-billion dollar industry around union busting, labor leaders are not 
beaten or incarcerated on a regular basis and it is relatively uncommon for 
judicial officials to accept bribes.108 To bring a lawsuit against a major 
multinational corporation takes courage. To file such a claim in the court of 
a country whose government regularly permits or sponsors violence against 
trade unionists is to risk one’s life. Opening themselves up to judicial and 
public scrutiny within their home countries may prove extremely dangerous 
for workers in some of the world’s leading garment producing nations. This 
burden may be somewhat ameliorated if a lawsuit is brought in the United 
States, where the proceedings are not as readily subject to the intimidation 
of corrupt, anti-union government officials.  
Alien Tort Claims Act cases often involve foreign plaintiffs suing in U.S. 
courts for violations of human rights, and alien plaintiffs would likely not 
adjudicate in the situs state as it “would not only be disadvantageous, but 
perhaps deadly.”109 The same holds true for these cases. If not able to sue in 
a U.S. courtroom, outside of the direct influence of corrupt government 
officials, garment workers would be exposing themselves to rampant 
corruption, forced payment of bribes, and quite possibly physical assault.110 
                                                            
104Id. at 247. 
105 U.S. Dep’t. of State, Country Report on Human Rights 2010: Mexico, at 13 (Apr. 
8, 2011), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ (reflecting that civil society 
organization reports demonstrated court decisions were overly “susceptible to improper 
influence by” state and local level “private and public entities”). 
106 Id. 
107 U.S. Dep’t of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (Apr. 8, 
2011), available at, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/index.htm. 
108 ITUC, supra note 75, at 115. 
109 Matthew R. Skolnik, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine in Alien Tort Claims 
Act Cases: A Shell of Its Former Self After WIWA, 16 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 187, 208 
(2002) (“even if they were legally able to do so, few alien plaintiffs would attempt to 
adjudicate international human rights law in the situs state” because of the likely, 
unfavorable consequences.”). 
110 Of course, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act forbids U.S. companies from bribing 
foreign officials, both directly and through intermediaries. Thus, if workers were forced 
to sue in a corrupt environment and a U.S. brand paid bribes to judicial official they 
could be charged and imprisoned in the United States. This would not, however, result 
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Thus, it is imperative that garment workers be able to sue for breach of 
jobber agreements in U.S. Courts if they choose to do so.111 
PART IV 
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES: MAKING SURE GARMENT WORKERS 
QUALIFY 
 
 Generally, only the parties to a contract can recover for breach of 
that contract. However, the law has provided avenues for recovery for those 
outside of the two contracting entities when a party is deemed a third-party 
beneficiary of the contract, as federal and most state courts follow the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts on this matter.112 New York, long the 
center of the fashion industry, and a state that many garment manufacturers 
still call home,113 also follows the Restatement rule.114 As both federal 
courts and New York courts have adopted the Restatement approach, this 
article analyzes the issue of whether garment workers in subcontracted 
factories would be considered third party beneficiaries to a jobber 
agreement between a manufacturer and a union in the context of the 
Restatement’s standard. 
 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,  
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition 
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties and either  
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the 
promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or  
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give 
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 
                                                            
in any improvement in working conditions inside the garment factory. 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-1 (2011). 
111 This is not to say that some foreign legal systems would not provide a judiciary 
less prone to corporate sympathy than that of the United States. However, since jobber 
agreements would be signed in the United States and most collegiate apparel brands are 
headquartered in the U.S., U.S. courts make the most sense. 
112 FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS § 5.3.A (Jeffrey S. 
Gutman ed., 2011), available at http://federalpracticemanual.org/node/31 (“The federal 
courts and most state courts follow the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in 
determining the viability of any third-party beneficiary claim.”). 
113 See, Della Hasselle, Designers Abandon Garment District as Groups Fight to 
Save It, DNA INFO (Aug. 31, 2001), 
http://www.dnainfo.com/20110831/midtown/designers-leave-garment-district-as-
groups-fight-save-it. 
114 LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Ernst & Young, 729 N.Y.S.2d 671, 676 (App. Div. 2001) 
(“For cases in which the claimant is not a party to the contract, but claims third-party 
rights therefrom, New York has adopted the standard set forth in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.”). 
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(2) An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an 
intended beneficiary.115 
 
The New York Court of Appeals, summarizing the Restatement 
standard, requires parties asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a 
contract to establish: 
(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between other 
parties, (2) that the contract was intended for their benefit and (3) 
that the benefit to them is sufficiently immediate, rather than 
incidental, to indicate the assumption by the contracting parties of 
a duty to compensate them if the benefit is lost.116 
 
The court will look to evidence of intent to determine whether an 
intended beneficiary exists.117 According to New York’s First Department, 
“the best evidence of the contracting parties’ intent is the language of the 
agreement itself.”118 
Language evidencing an intent for garment workers to be third-party 
beneficiaries of the contract can be expressly included in the jobber 
agreements. This would be ideal, as it would render any brand motions on 
this issue subject to summary judgment. Many contracts do specifically 
reference individuals or organizations as intended third party beneficiaries 
directly in the contract language, so its inclusion need not be seen as 
entirely unique. In the absence of such obvious language, however, drafters 
of jobber agreements would be wise to include language specifically 
delineating the reasoning for each clause of the contract. For example, if a 
provision were included that required brands to maintain long-term 
relationships with supplier factories, it should specifically be stated that this 
is “to ensure that supplier factories receive enough orders at adequate 
prices to enable them to provide their employees with stable employment.” 
Similarly, a requirement that brands pay enough to allow factories to 
provide a living wage to its employees could be couched in language that 
makes clear that the requirement exists, “so that employees are able to earn 
a living wage and supply their families’ basic needs.” This language would 
serve as a further indicator of the partiers’ intent to directly benefit supplier 
factory employees. 
                                                            
115 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 (2011). 
116 Mendel v. Henry Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 748, 785 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
2006). 
117 Richard Siegler & Eva Talel, Construction Defects: Third-Party Beneficiaries, 
227 N.Y.L.J. 83(2002), available at http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub604.pdf (“if 
a beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on a promise as manifesting an intention 
to confer a right on him, he is intended beneficiary”). 
118 Edge Mgmt. Consulting Inc. v. Blank, 807 N.Y.S.2d 353, 369 (App. Div. 2006). 
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Absent such express language, subcontracted employees could still be 
considered third party beneficiaries to a jobber agreement, provided there is 
evidence of the contracting parties’ desire to empower them with such 
rights. Contracts need not explicitly identify third party beneficiaries.119 
Instead, a court will consider circumstances indicating “that the promisee 
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.”120 
The court will consider whether the “manifestation of the intention of the 
promisor and promisee is sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make 
reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable.’”121 Recently, for 
example, a New York District Court found that a woman arranging hospice 
care for her father demonstrated that her father was an intended third party 
even though the contract between the hospice care provider and her father 
did not specifically name her as a potential beneficiary.122 The agreement 
itself named the woman as her father’s primary caregiver, and the Court 
found this sufficient to hold that “the agreement specifically contemplated 
the provision of assistance to plaintiff, as primary caregiver, by members of 
the Hospice team.”123  
Further, the precise identity of a third party beneficiary need not be 
known at the time of the contract. Thus, the fact that a jobber agreement 
would cover a large number of factories, some of which the brand may not 
contract with at the time it signs the agreement, does not preclude 
employees of a supplier factory from exercising rights as third party 
beneficiaries. In 2011, for instance, the Third Department found that a 
company that leased a medical facility was a third party beneficiary to the 
contract between the landlord and the company hired to design and build 
the facility, even though the leasing company had not yet been formed at 
the time of construction.124  
Of course, New York courts have not found that third parties were 
entitled to recovery in all cases. Some of those cases in which a third-party 
beneficiary was not recognized include situations in which the contract at 
issue specifically “provided that nothing contained in the contract ‘shall 
create a contractual relationship with or a cause of action in favor of a third 
                                                            
119 Finch, Pruyn & Co. v. M. Wilson Control Services Inc., 658 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498 
(App. Div. 1997). 
120 Cianciotto v. Hospice Care Network, 927 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (Dist. Ct. 2011) 
(looking to the contractual setting and whether the manifestation of both parties intent 
was sufficient, will determine whether the beneficiary’s reliance was both reasonable 
and probable). 
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Saratoga Schenectady Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Bette & Cring, 921 N.Y.S.2d 
393, 395 (App. Div. 2011). 
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party . . . .’”125 It is imperative, therefore, that negotiators of these jobber 
agreements not permit this type of language to enter the contract.  
Other cases in which individuals were not granted third party beneficiary 
status have rested on whether the agreement was designed with an intent to 
benefit that person. New York courts have chosen not to confer third party 
beneficiary status in situations such as where a husband tried to assert that 
his LLC was an intended beneficiary of the separation agreement he 
entered into with his wife,126 or where a subcontractor sought third party 
beneficiary status on a contract between a general contractor and the state, 
but failed to demonstrated that the contracts intended to benefit the 
subcontractor in more than an incidental way.127 Additionally, the Fourth 
Department found an incidental benefit in an employment contract between 
an employer and employee, not the intent to confer a third-party benefit, 
where a couple was being sued by an employee who was injured while 
making a delivery at their home.128 These cases reinforce the importance of 
intent in the third party beneficiary analysis and should serve as a caution 
to organizers to make sure that the language of jobber agreements clearly 
evidences an intent to confer third party beneficiary status on employees of 
supplier factories, such that workers’ reliance on the notion that brands 
have direct responsibility for ensuring the provisions of the jobber 
agreement are upheld in supplier factories is deemed reasonable.  
Attempts by workers to sue the brands that contract with their employers 
are extremely rare. However, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit heard a case 
brought by employees of Wal-Mart suppliers in Bangladesh, China, 
Indonesia, Nicaragua, and Swaziland.129 A component of their claim 
against Wal-Mart alleged that the workers were third-party beneficiaries of 
the code of conduct that Wal-Mart incorporated into contracts with all of its 
suppliers.130 Plaintiffs alleged that they were third-party beneficiaries to 
Wal-Mart’s obligation to both inspect the facilities of its suppliers and to 
maintain the working conditions outlined in the code of conduct.131 The 
Court held, however, that Wal-Mart did not actually have a duty to inspect 
the factories or require the maintenance of certain working conditions.132 
Specifically, the Court found, “[t]he language and structure of the 
agreement show that Wal-Mart reserved the right to inspect the suppliers, 
                                                            
125 See, e.g., Greece Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Tetra Tech Eng’rs., 911 N.Y.S.2d 563, 564 
(App. Div. 2010). 
126 Reads Co. v. Katz, 900 N.Y.S.2d 131 (App. Div. 2010). 
127 IMS Engineers-Architects v. State, 858 N.Y.S.2d 486 (App. Div. 2008). 
128 Chavis v. Klock, 846 N.Y.S.2d 490 (App. Div. 2007). 
129 Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009). 
130 Id. at 681. 
131 Id. at 681-82. 
132 Id. at 681. 
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but did not adopt a duty to inspect them.”133 There is also recent precedent 
for garment workers from an Adidas supplier factory in Indonesia to be 
permitted to intervene as a third party a lawsuit between the University of 
Wisconsin and Adidas.134 At issue in the suit between the University and 
one of its licensees is whether Adidas failed to comport with the wage and 
severance requirements laid out in the University’s code of conduct.135 
Jobber agreements provide a distinct advantage over codes of conduct in 
this regard. The language of these agreements, tracking the language 
developed through the Designated Suppliers Program, would require that 
brands affirmatively undertake the duty to increase the prices they pay to 
supplier factories at a level sufficient for those suppliers to pay a living 
wage, as well as the responsibility to maintain long-term relationships with 
those supplier factories so that improved wages and working conditions can 
be sustained. Thus, beyond simply permitting inspection and crafting a set 
of standards, jobber agreements would require brands to take action. 
Language should also be included in the jobber agreements requiring 
brands to explicitly take steps to ensure that the right to organize is 
respected in its supplier factories. This language would clearly distinguish 
jobber agreements from codes of conduct, such as that of Wal-Mart, and 
would alleviate the Ninth Circuit’s concerns regarding the existence of an 
affirmative contractual duty. 
PART V 
FORUM NON CONVENIENS: A CAUTIONARY TALE 
 
Forum non conveniens is a legal claim raised by a defendant who feels 
that being subject to a lawsuit in a United States court is inconvenient. 
Most forum non conveniens arguments are circumvented in breach of 
contract cases by the inclusion of forum selection clauses directly in the 
contract.136 The policy behind this phenomenon largely centers around 
courts’ desire to uphold the provisions of contracts as parties agreed to 
them. The Southern District of New York recently found, for example: 
 
                                                            
133 Id. at 681-82. 
134 Noah Goetzel, Court Says Former Adidas Workers Can Testify in Suit, THE 
BADGER HERALD, Jan. 24, 2013, available at: 
http://badgerherald.com/news/2013/01/24/court_ says_former_ad.php#.URat_ERu_mg 
135 Id. 
136 In 2005, the Hague Conference on Private International Law recognized the 
importance of permitting contracting parties to choose where litigation should occur 
and adopted a Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The United States has 
signed, but not ratified, this convention. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, available at http:// 
www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98. 
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  [W]here it can be said with reasonable assurance that at the time 
 they entered the contract, the parties to a freely negotiated private 
 international commercial agreement contemplated the claimed 
 inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such claim of 
 inconvenience should be heard to render the forum clause 
 unenforceable.137  
 
As U.S. courts are often hostile to foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. 
corporations in the absence of a proper forum selection clause, jobber 
agreement negotiators must view recent forum non conveniens cases as a 
warning to take steps to ensure that a foreign union can sue a U.S. brand for 
violation of a jobber agreement in U.S. courts.138 To ensure that a forum 
non conveniens claim by a brand is unsuccessful, jobber agreements must 
explicitly include a provision stating both that U.S. law governs the 
agreement, and that the parties are subject to suit for breach of contract 
within the courts of the United States. More specifically, these agreements 
should state that New York law presides over the agreements and that the 
brands subject themselves to the jurisdiction of New York Courts. As 
stated earlier, many major garment brands are headquartered in New York, 
so New York is an obvious choice for the convenience of these 
companies.139 New York also has the added distinction of upholding 
mandatory forum selection clauses as a matter of law.140  
Absent a sound forum selection clause, a U.S. brand could make a forum 
non conveniens argument and attempt to remove a breach of contract case 
from the jurisdiction of United States courts.141 Forum non conveniens may 
be raised by a defendant who feels as though “a more appropriate forum 
may hear the claim.”142 Often, defendants make a forum non conveniens 
argument because they believe that a plaintiff will not re-file the case and 
                                                            
137 Eastman Chem. Co. v. Nestle Waters Mgmt. & Tech., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
99123, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2011). 
138 See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (demonstrating that 
the Court prioritizes preventing forum shopping over the plaintiff’s convenience). 
139 If a non-New York brand (such as Nike, which is headquartered in Oregon) insists 
on including choice of law and choice of forum clauses for the state in which they are 
headquartered, that state’s laws must be looked at by the unions involved in negotiating 
the jobber agreement. Many companies have offices in New York, even if they are 
headquartered elsewhere, so NY is not likely to be inconvenient. This article is limited 
to analyzing New York jurisprudence. 
140 N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1402 (McKinney 2011). 
141 Presumably, the brand would argue the case is better suited to be heard in the 
country where the factory is located. 
142 John R. Wilson, Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the 
Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 659, 661 
(2004). 
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the litigation will end.143 This may be an increasingly valid argument as 
several countries, particularly in Latin America, have adopted statutes 
prohibiting the filing of a case once that case has been dismissed in a 
foreign jurisdiction.144 In contrast, “where a party to a contract has agreed 
in advance of litigation to submit to the jurisdiction of a court, she is later 
precluded from attacking that court's jurisdiction on grounds of forum non 
conveniens.”145 Including choice of law and forum selection clauses within 
jobber agreements is particularly important in light of recent forum non 
conveniens jurisprudence. 
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address the issue 
of forum non conveniens held that it is a threshold issue, and thus may be 
decided upon without a court first resolving whether it has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case.146 The forum non conveniens doctrine gives trial 
courts significant deference, as higher courts reverse such decisions only if 
the trial court clearly abused its discretion.147 According to the Supreme 
Court, “[a] federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground of 
forum non conveniens ‘when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear 
the case, and . . . trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . 
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to 
plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . the chosen forum is inappropriate because of 
considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal 
problems.’”148  
The Court went on to say that although the defendant carries a heavy 
burden when opposing the plaintiff’s chosen forum, this burden lessens 
when the plaintiff’s choice is not its home forum.149 Although the Supreme 
Court has provided that an adequate alternative forum must exist, and a 
series of private and public interest factors must be considered,150 many 
                                                            
143 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 
B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 (2010). 
144 Id. at 1093. 
145 Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Worley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 57 (App. Div. 
1999). 
146 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007). 
147 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). 
148 See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 423 (emphasis omitted) (such requirements include an 
alternative forum where jurisdiction exists and prejudice and inconvenience would 
occur in the chosen forum or administrative and legal problems would arise and 
adversely affect the chosen forum). 
149 Id. at 430 (emphasis omitted) (noting that there is a presumption in the plaintiff’s 
favor, but that it “applies with less force” when the plaintiff does not choose its home 
forum). 
150 “An interest to be considered, and the one likely to be most pressed, is the private 
interest of the litigant. Important considerations are the relative ease of access to 
sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and 
the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, 
if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make 
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the 
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courts have not directly applied these factors and “the forum non 
conveniens doctrine does not lend itself to the development of a 
comprehensive legal model for predicting the outcomes of forum non 
conveniens decisions.”151 As such, it is best to analogize to a series of cases 
with what would likely be similar facts—those cases brought under the 
Alien Tort Claims Act.152  
The Alien Tort Claims Act, originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
states, “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”153 Since the seminal case of 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,154 plaintiffs have used the Alien Tort Claims Act to 
bring claims in U.S. courts for the violation of human rights in other 
nations.155 Workers rights are human rights, and although the cases at issue 
would be brought for breach of contract and not tort claims, many of the 
injuries would be similar. If brands fail to comply with the terms of jobber 
agreements and do not provide a healthy, safe, working environment in 
their supplier factories, workers could suffer physical injury, long-term 
health consequences, and even death. Forced confinement and slavery are 
remarkably common in the garment industry as well.156  
The idea that workers rights are human rights is internationally 
recognized. According to Amnesty International:  
                                                            
enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained . . . . Factors of public interest also have 
place in applying the doctrine. Administrative difficulties follow for courts when 
litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury 
duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which 
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there 
is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the 
country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having 
localized controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the 
trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern 
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict 
of laws, and in law foreign to itself.” Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). 
151 Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial 
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens (Duke Univ. Working Paper, 2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033. 
152 The underlying legal claims arise from different causes of action—one torts and 
one breach of contracts. However, the forum non conveniens arguments would be 
similar as both would consist of foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. corporations for failing to 
fulfill their obligations, resulting in the deprivation of the human rights of citizens of 
foreign countries. 
153 Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). 
154 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
155 Id. 
156 See, e.g., Brian Byrnes, Victims Break Chains of Slavery, THE CNN FREEDOM 
PROJECT ENDING MODERN DAY SLAVERY (Apr. 18, 2011), http://thecnnfreedomproject 
.blogs.cnn.com/2011/04/18/victims-break-chains-of-slavery/ (providing stories of 
exploited victims, stressing the vast number of clandestine factories). 
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Under international law, all workers have a human right to 
organize and to bargain collectively. These rights are an 
essential foundation to the realization of other rights, and are 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and the International  Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant  Workers and Members of Their Families, as well 
as conventions  adopted by the International Labor 
Organization.157  
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 
which along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, make up the International 
Bill of Human Rights, provides, 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work which ensure, in particular:  
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, 
with:  
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value 
without distinction of any kind, in particular women being 
guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by 
men, with equal pay for equal work;  
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families in 
accordance with the provisions of the present Covenant;  
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;  
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his 
employment to an appropriate higher level, subject to no 
considerations other than those of seniority and competence;  
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours and 
periodic holidays with pay, as well as remuneration for public 
holidays158  
                                                            
157 Workers Have a Right to Organize, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Feb. 19, 2011), 
http://blog.amnestyusa.org/us/workers-have-a-right-to-organize/ (emphasis omitted). It 
is worth noting, however, that the U.S. has not ratified International Labor 
Organization Conventions 87 or 98 (dealing with the freedom of association and right 
to organize respectively), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families. 
158 Int’l Covenant on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, G.A. RES. 2200A (XXI), at art. 7 
(Dec. 16, 1966), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm; see also 
993 U.N.T.S. 14531, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=4&lang=en (reflecting that the United States has signed 
but not ratified the Covenant). 
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In Article 8, the Covenant provides, 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:  
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade 
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization 
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and 
social interests. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of 
this right other than those prescribed by law and which are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public order or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.159  
 
Thus, the right to form and join trade unions is a fundamental human 
right. If brands refuse to honor the terms of jobber agreements, which 
would require that supplier factories respect the right to organize and 
collectively bargain, it would therefore be a violation of internationally 
recognized human rights norms.  
Unfortunately, however, recent Second Circuit opinions have limited and 
significantly weakened the ability of foreign plaintiffs to bring human 
rights claims through the Alien Tort Claims Act against U.S. corporations. 
In 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld 
plaintiffs’ choice of forum where the defendants were foreign corporations 
alleged to have collaborated with the Nigerian government in the 
perpetuation of human rights abuses in Nigeria.160 In Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.,161 the Court “emphasize[d] the U.S. interest in adjudicating 
human rights violations and appear[ed] to raise the bar for granting forum 
non conveniens dismissals.”162  
Quickly, however, the Court moved to limit its holding in Wiwa. The 
following year, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
New York found that the U.S. interest in adjudicating human rights 
violations emphasized in Wiwa is only significant in cases that involve 
torture and thus implicate the Torture Victims Protection Act.163 Further 
reducing the Alien Tort Claims Act, the Court then found environmental 
torts not to come under the protection of the Act because “plaintiffs have 
not demonstrated that high levels of environmental pollution within a 
nation's borders, causing harm to human life, health, and development, 
                                                            
159 Int’l Covenant, supra note 158, at art. 8. 
160 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
161 Id. 
162 Jeffrey E. Baldwin, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of 
Forum Non Conveniens, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 749, 759 (2007). 
163 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (dismissing a case 
on grounds of forum non conveniens which was brought by the citizens of Peru and 
Ecuador against Texaco, Inc. for the pollution of rainforests and rivers). 
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violate ‘well-established, universally recognized norms of international 
law.’”164  
The Court returned to its Wiwa analysis in 2003, but only because the 
case involved allegations of “genocide, war crimes, torture, and 
enslavement,” which the court found to be “jus cogens165 violations of 
international law.”166 In 2006, the Court further limited the opportunity for 
an Alien Tort Claims Act plaintiff to survive a forum non conveniens 
motion by finding that “the controlling question is not whether the United 
States has some interest in adjudicating the case but whether the U.S. 
interest outweighs the alternative forum’s interest.”167 In that case, the 
Court found the interest of the United States was outweighed by Turkey, 
and consequently granted the defendant’s forum non conveniens motion.168 
The case involved Turkish plaintiffs suing Coca-Cola (a United States 
corporation) after managers at one of Coca-Cola’s Turkish bottling plants 
allegedly assaulted employees who were engaged in a non-violent labor 
demonstration.169  
Most recently, in 2008, the Court further weakened Wiwa, in a case 
brought by a group of “Kurdish women whose husbands were allegedly 
imprisoned, tortured, and killed by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq.”170 
The plaintiffs alleged “violations of the law of nations and the Torture 
Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") under the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(“ATCA”) . . . and common law torts under New York law, for allegedly 
providing ‘kickbacks’ to the Hussein regime in connection with their 
participation in the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program . . . .”171 The 
Court dismissed the case on forum non conveniens grounds finding, 
“where, as here, there is an adequate foreign forum with a profound interest 
in adjudicating the dispute and litigation here would be significantly less 
convenient, the abstract interest of the United States in enforcing 
international law does not compel an assertion of jurisdiction.”172 Referring 
to the interest of the United States as abstract, and failing to frame that 
interest in terms of human rights, likely foreshadows further retreat from 
                                                            
164 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 510, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
165 Jus cogens refers to “A mandatory or peremptory norm of general international 
law accepted and recognized by the international community as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
166 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp 2d 289, 339 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
167 Baldwin, supra note 162, at 766. 
168 Turedi v. Coca Cola Co., 460 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
169 Id. 
170 Mastafa v. Australian Wheat Bd. Ltd., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73305, 1 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
171 Id. at 1–2. 
172 Id. at 33. 
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the position of permitting foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United 
States for human rights abuses committed abroad. 
  As the Second Circuit continues to roll back the availability of U.S. 
courts for plaintiffs alleging violations of international norms, it is critical 
that jobber agreements include both a choice of law provision and a forum 
selection clause in order to ensure access to U.S. courts for workers in 
supplier factories. Because the workers would be alleging a breach of 
contract and not a tort, they are not likely to run into as many difficulties as 
those plaintiffs alleging jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Claims Act. In the 
absence of a proper forum selection provision, the Second Circuit is likely 
to continue its trend of not looking favorably on foreign plaintiffs suing 
U.S. corporations. Although U.S. unions would also be signatories to the 
jobber agreements and could join such lawsuits as non-foreign plaintiffs, 
thereby giving plaintiffs’ choice of forum greater deference, foreign unions 
would be remiss to rely solely on the often cautious general counsel’s 
office of U.S. unions to determine whether to become party to a lawsuit.173 
Instead, they should insist on the inclusion of choice of law and forum 
selection provisions in all jobber agreements.174 
The Supreme Court may be poised to make it even more difficulty for 
foreign plaintiffs to bring suit in the United States under the Alien Tort 
Statute. On October 1, 2012, The Supreme Court reheard the case of Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum. This case was first heard in March of 2012, but 
the Court ordered the attorneys to re-file briefs on the issue of “Whether 
and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. §1350, 
allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of 
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
States.”175 The Court’s decision that a presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to the Alien Tort Statute may impact the ability of 
garment workers to sue in U.S. Courts where the brands whose garments 
they produce are not U.S. brands.176 The Supreme Court’s rollback of the 
                                                            
173 Theoretically, for example, a U.S. union could be in the middle of productive 
negotiations with a U.S. brand and decide that it did not want to risk jeopardizing this 
relationship by suing that brand for violations of a contract pertaining to a factory in 
another country. 
174 Of course, it would be wise for U.S. unions to join in any litigation brought under 
the jobber agreements because improving conditions in garment factories around the 
world would give companies less incentive to produce their apparel in other countries. 
This, in turn, could create more manufacturing jobs in the United States and would lead 
to an increase in membership for U.S. unions. 
175 Sarah A. Altschuller, A Surprise Twist: U.S. Supreme Court Will Rehear Kiobel, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW, FOLEY HOAG, LLP, Mar 5, 2012, 
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2012/03/a-surprise-twist-u-s-supreme-court-will-rehear-
kiobel/. 
176 Kiobel v. Dutch Royal Petroleum, 2013 WL 1628935. 
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protections of the Alien Tort Statute makes it even more imperative that 
workers focus on contractual claims and that organizers succeed in 
requiring the adoption of comprehensive jobber agreements. 
PART VI: PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION177 
 
 Implementation of jobber agreements in the collegiate apparel 
market will require multiple levels of strategic organizing on the part of 
both student and worker organizations. Initially, these groups will have to 
decide which brands to target first. The decision must be based on a 
number of factors, including which brands have the most influence in the 
collegiate apparel industry and which brands are most susceptible to public 
pressure. Two brands immediately come to mind: Nike and Knights 
Apparel. Nike is an obvious choice because it is extremely conscious of its 
public image and has fought for years against allegations of sweatshop 
abuses in its supplier factories. This sensitivity, and its history of 
engagement with university licensing officials, student activists, and unions 
in various countries around its corporate social responsibility programs 
renders Nike particularly well equipped for swift implementation of a 
jobber agreement. 
Knights Apparel, while not a brand whose name is well known to most 
consumers, “is the leading supplier of college-logo apparel to American 
universities . . . .”178 The company has already shown a commitment to 
exploring some of the tenets of a jobber agreement, including payment of a 
premium by brands to factories to ensure that employees of those factories 
earn a decent wage, and a willingness to allow the Worker Rights 
Consortium to monitor factory conditions. In 2003, workers at the BJ&B 
factory in Alta Gracia, Dominican Republic organized a union and forced 
their employer, who produced for major collegiate apparel brands such as 
Nike and Reebok, to pay them higher wages, provide clean water, and 
improve conditions.179 In 2007, however, Nike and Reebok pulled all of 
their orders out of BJ&B, causing the factory to shut down, as it relied on 
those companies for a significant percentage of its total orders.180 A couple 
                                                            
177 As an attorney, I recognize that practical implementation is better left to the 
organizers on the ground. However, as a former organizer myself, I cannot resist the 
temptation to provide a few skeletal thoughts. Most of these ideas have come from 
conversations with the organizers themselves. 
178 Steven Greenhouse, Factory Defies Sweatshop Label, but Can It Thrive?, NY 
TIMES (Jul. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/business/global/18shirt.html?page wanted=all. 
179 Ross, supra note 40, at 67-68. 
180 Abandoning BJ&B Union Workers, UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST SWEATSHOPS, 
available at http://usas.org/campaigns/sweat-free-campus/dont-pay-the-fla/about-the-
fla/corporate-cover-up-3-bjb-factory-case/. 
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of years later, after continued organizing by both students and workers, the 
employees who were laid off from BJ&B were hired by the Alta Gracia 
factory, which is owned by Knights Apparel. This factory pays its 
“employees nearly three and a half times the prevailing minimum wage,” 
respects the employees’ union, and has opened itself up to continuous 
monitoring of working conditions by the WRC.181 Joseph Bozich, the CEO 
of Knights Apparel, regularly touts the company’s efforts at Alta Gracia.182 
An agreement to replicate these conditions in all of Knights Apparel’s 
supplier factories would push the company even farther, compelling it to 
demonstrate that it is truly committed to the people who make their 
products. 
Knights Apparel and Nike are merely suggestions, of course. Any 
determination of a target must be made in consultation with the workers 
whose unions would be signing the first agreements and must take into 
consideration what brands are producing collegiate apparel in their 
countries, and in what quantities. A small group of unions would most 
likely have to be convened in order to make initial implementation 
possible. Once this group of unions joins together, they can create a 
consortium that would coordinate negotiations, implementation, and future 
participation by other unions and brands. Unions with which USAS already 
has a working relationship are likely candidates for early collaboration, 
such as unions in Haiti,183 Honduras,184 the Dominican Republic,185 
Kenya,186 and the United States.187 Representatives from these unions 
                                                            
181 Greenhouse, supra note 1788. 
182 See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 1787 (“Alta Gracia . . . [is] revered as protector 
of the Dominicans. (“alta gracia” translates to “exalted grace.”)). 
183 USAS and the WRC have a long-standing relationship with Batay Ouvriye. See, 
e.g., WRC Factory Investigation Grupo M/Codevi, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORITUM (Feb. 
15, 2006), http://workersrights.org/Freports/GrupoM.asp. 
184 USAS worked closely with the Central General de Trabajadores de Honduras 
(CGT) union federation on its most recent high-profile factory solidarity campaign at 
the Jerzees Nuevo Dia in Honduras. See, e.g., Victory at Jerzees Nuevo Dia! 
Groundbreaking Contract Signed at Russell Plant in Honduras, UNITED STUDENTS 
AGAINST SWEATSHOPS (May 23, 2011), http://usas.org/2011/05/23/victory-at-jerzees-
nuevo-dia-groundbreaking-contract-signed-at-russell-plant-in-honduras/. 
185 USAS activists have worked with FEDOTRAZONAS, a union in the Dominican 
Republic, since the late 1990s. See After a Decade of Struggle, Dominican Republic 
Worker Activists Make College Apparel Again, UNITED STUDENTS AGAINST 
SWEATSHOPS (July 19, 2010), http://usas.org/2010/07/19/worker-activists-make-
college-apparel/. 
186 USAS activists have engaged in a number of factory solidarity campaigns with 
the Tailors and Textile Workers Union in Kenya, and has sent interns to the country. 
See, e.g., Justice at Rising Sun!, JUSTICE AT RISING SUN BLOG (Nov. 17. 2006), 
http://justiceatrisingsun.blogspot.com/2006/11/justice-at-rising-sun.html. 
187 USAS was created out of the experience of summer interns at UNITE, and has 
strong relationships with a number of U.S. unions including the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the United Steelworkers, and the Communication Workers 
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would need to decide exactly how a consortium could operate to further all 
of their interests and how negotiations would take place. Presumably, the 
consortium would choose representatives to enter into negotiations. Brands 
would then negotiate with the consortium directly, and multiple member 
unions would become signatories to each agreement.  
Students’ primary role would be to run a two-layered campaign, 
simultaneously targeting both brands and their university administrators. 
On the one hand, students would demand their universities agree to only 
source collegiate apparel from brands that have signed jobber agreements. 
This could be implemented gradually with the percentage of collegiate 
apparel required to be produced by brands that signed on to jobber 
agreements increasing as the number of brands who have signed the 
agreements increases. Individual universities would decide whether or not 
to adopt a policy requiring licensees to sign jobber agreements. Universities 
that have already expressed a commitment to the principles of the DSP 
should consider the jobber agreement approach an extension of the DSP 
and thus ought to readily adopt policies requiring licensees to sign jobber 
agreements.188 Each university would, in turn, put additional pressure on 
brands that want to continue to produce collegiate apparel, as the school’s 
new policy of sourcing primarily from brands that have signed jobber 
agreements would push orders towards those brands that have adopted 
jobber agreements. 
In addition to organizing on campus, students would target the brands 
directly and urge them to sign on to jobber agreements. USAS has a long 
history of this type of organizing, and can pressure brands by threatening to 
attack their image not only on campuses, but also in retail stores, at 
company events, and on the internet through social media websites and 
other online organizing techniques. Students can also reach out to their 
allies in community anti-sweatshop groups, unions that represent workers 
in other industries, and student and community groups in other countries 
                                                            
of America. USAS has also collaborated on solidarity campaigns with garment factory 
workers in the United States. See, e.g., Hats Off: A U.S. Cap Company Gets a Hard 
Look from Universities, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 2, 2002), http://www43. 
homepage.villanova.edu/louis.giglio/index2.html. 
188 These schools include Brandeis University, Brown University, California State 
University – Fullerton, Columbia University, Cornell University, DePaul University, 
Duke University, Fordham University, Georgetown University, Grand Valley State 
University, Hamilton College, Indiana University, Marquette University, Oberlin 
College, Purdue University, Regis University, Santa Clara University, Seattle 
University, Skidmore College, Smith College, Syracuse University, the State 
University of New York at Albany, the entire University of California system, the 
University of Connecticut, the University of Iowa, the University of Maine – 
Farmington, the University of Miami, the University of Michigan, the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the University of Wisconsin – Madison, Ursinus 
College, Washington State University, and Western Washington University. College 
and University Policy Statements, WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, http://www. 
workersrights.org/dsp.asp (last visited June 5, 2012). 
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where these brands sell goods, and enlist their organizing assistance. All of 
this organizing will be done alongside garment workers organizing at the 
factory level and in their communities where brands value their image as 
benevolent employers. Given that supplier factory owners would also reap 
the benefits of higher premiums and long-term relationships (which would 
allow their factories to stay open longer and permit better planning as they 
could count on consistent orders), factory managers may also begin to 
encourage brands to sign jobber agreements.  
CONCLUSION 
 
 United Students Against Sweatshops is arguably the most successful 
student activist organization in modern history. Their ability to alter the 
way consumers view the role and responsibilities of multinational 
corporations in global systems of production is unprecedented. In addition, 
their ability to use a solidarity model to effect concrete change in the lives 
of garment workers (as well as university employees and workers in the 
communities in which they live) is remarkable. USAS has continuously 
altered its organizing strategy to meet the ever-changing challenges of the 
global supply chain. Adopting a strategy of pursuing jobber agreements is a 
logical next step. Jobber agreements would give garment workers far 
greater recourse than they currently possess, and would provide an avenue 
for increased accountability among collegiate apparel brands. The 
agreements could be drafted relatively easily in a manner that renders moot 
all preliminary legal concerns and permits employees of supplier factories 
to have their cases against major apparel brands heard in U.S. courts on the 
merits. The collegiate apparel industry is a microcosm of the larger global 
garment industry, which has been the prototype for global supply chain 
production in countless other industries. As such, the impact of the success 
of jobber agreements in the collegiate apparel industry could reverberate 
exponentially, serving as a model for organizers in other manufacturing 
industries. 
